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Recent Decisions
CIvIL RIGHTS-CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-TITLE VII-SEx Dis-
CRIMINATION-EMPLOYEE PENSION PLANS-The United States Su-
preme Court has held that an employer cannot offer a privately
run pension annuity plan which at retirement pays women a
smaller monthly annuity than men, where women and men con-
tribute equally to the plan.
Arizona Governing Committee For Tax Deferred Annuity & De-
ferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
A voluntary pension plan for employees of the state of Arizona
was established by the state in 1974 in order to give the employees
the option to postpone payment of a portion of wages until retire-
ment.' A state-created governing committee accepted bids on the
plan from private insurance companies and subsequently selected
several of the companies to participate.2 Employees opting to join
the plan were only allowed to choose from the insurance companies
pre-selected by the state and also were required to choose from
among three standard retirement pay-out options,' the most at-
tractive of which was the option where the employee would receive
monthly annuity payments for the remainder of the employee's life
after retirement.4 One of the factors used in determining the pay-
1. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3494 (1983). The relevant Arizona- statutory sections cre-
ated a governing committee to administer the plan, and enumerated the rights and duties of
the committee members and plan participants and the mechanisms of the plan. See ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-871 to 874 (1974 & Supp. 1983).
2. 103 S. Ct. at 3494.
3. Id. The two less attractive options were: (1) a single lump-sum payment upon re-
tirement, and (2) periodic payments of a fixed sum for a fixed period of time. The employee
was not bound by his or her pre-retirement decision as to the plans, but could opt for a
different form of pay-out upon retirement. Id.
4. Id. The annuity option was popular because of the unattractive features of the
other plans. The lump-sum payment required the employee to pay tax on the total amount
in the year of receipt. Id. The fixed income for a fixed period of time option relieved the tax
problem, but did not guarantee an income for the remainder of the employee's life if the
employee incorrectly speculated as to his or her life expectancy. Id. at 3505 (Powell, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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out of the deferred compensation to employees who selected this
option was the employee's sex.' All of the insurance companies
chosen by the state used some form of gender-based mortality ta-
ble which would pay men a larger monthly annuity than women
who deferred the same amount.' This dissimilar treatment of the
sexes stemmed from the fact that women as a class live longer than
men.
7
Respondent Nathalie Norris was employed by the Arizona De-
partment of Economic Security, and she decided to join the state's
pension plan.' Pursuant to that decision, she requested on May 3,
1975, that the standard contribution to the fund be invested in the
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's fixed annuity con-
tract.' Soon afterward, the state began to withhold $199.50 from
her monthly salary.10
After pursuing all administrative options without success, on
April 25, 1978, Norris filed an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona against the state of Arizona, the
governing committee, and several committee members, alleging
that administration of the annuity plan was a violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as the plan discriminated based
upon the sex of the individual. 2 The district court granted Norris'
requests for certification of a class, and summary judgment in
5. 103 S. Ct. at 3494-95. The other factors involved were the amount of wages de-
ferred by the employee (plus interest) and the age at which the employee retired. Id. Justice
Marshall mentioned some other factors having an effect on life expectancy that were ex-
cluded from consideration of the annuity amount, e.g., smoking and drinking habits, weight,
medical history and family history. Id.
6. Id. at 3495. Justice Marshall noted that not all insurance companies participating
in the plan used the same method of sex classification. Most of the companies used separate
tables for men and women based on life expectancy while one company used a single mor-
tality table for men, and treated women as if they were men six years younger, with a
younger man's life expectancy. Id. at 3495 n.2.




11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides in
part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
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favor of the class was ordered on March 12, 1980.18 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion.14 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari,15 and in a per curiam ruling held that the scheme violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that all contributions
to retirement benefits made after the decision be determined on a
sex-neutral basis, thereby disallowing retroactive relief.16
Justice Marshall, in the portions of his lead opinion that at-
tracted a majority,'7 first addressed the issue of whether there
would have been a violation of Title VII if the state had run the
plan internally. without any private company intervention.18 Jus-
tice Marshall began with a consideration of a case in which that
very issue was presented, City of Los Angeles Department of
Water v. Manhart.e He explained that in Manhart the Court held
an employer in violation of Title VII when the employer required
its female employees to make a larger pay-in to a pension fund
that was employer-operated, only to receive the same monthly ben-
efits as male employees upon retirement.20 Following the Manhart
13. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans v. Norris, 486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1980). The class certified consisted of all
female employees of the state of Arizona who had enrolled in the pension plan, or would do
so in the future. Id. at 645-46.
14. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
15. 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 3492.
17. Justice Marshall was joined in Parts I, II and III of his opinion by Justices Bren-
nan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Powell, dissenting in part and concurring in
part, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist as to Parts
I, II, and III of his opinion and by Justice O'Connor as to Part III. Id. at 3504 (Powell, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
18. Id. at 3496.
19. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 3494. See 435 U.S. at 717. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Manhart, stated the proposition that although women as a class do live longer than men as
a class, the unambiguous focus of Title VII is on the individual and not the class, and re-
jected the proposal that longevity, and not sex, was the controlling basis for the difference in
contribution. Id. at 707-08, and 712-13.
The consideration by the Manhart Court of whether or not a factor other than sex (i.e.,
longevity) was a reason for the different treatment was necessary because of the Bennett
Amendment, which states in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages
or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The provision referred to in the Bennett Amendment is the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), which provides, inter alia, that wages of men and
women can be unequal if the inequality is based upon "a differential based on any other
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Court's reasoning, Justice Marshall declared that the sex-classifica-
tion of employees is as much a violation of Title VII at the pay-out
stage of a pension plan as it is at the pay-in stage.21 With the tim-
ing argument met, Justice Marshall next concluded that the sex
discrimination issue was essentially the same as in Manhart: al-
though there is actuarial evidence that women as a class live longer
than men, in keeping with the tenets of Title VII, there was no
justification for different treatment of individual men and individ-
ual women.22 Justice Marshall also found that the voluntary aspect
of the Arizona plan did not warrant a different result from that of
Manhart, since Title VII deals with employment discrimination in
absolute terms, and does not make the discriminatory act less se-
vere simply because the employee can avoid it by choice.23
Noting that the state of Arizona would have violated Title VII if
it had administered the plan itself, Justice Marshall next consid-
ered the critical issue of whether or not the calculation and pay-
ment of the benefits by the private insurance companies as op-
posed to the employer-operated system of Manhart, created a
valid distinction that would absolve petitioners of a Manhart-type
violation. 4 He reached the conclusion that the state was liable,
since even though the plan involved the possible selection of a pri-
vate sexually discriminatory open market entity, the employer was
ultimately responsible for all aspects of the employment situa-
factor other than sex" provided that the cure under the Act does not reduce the wage rate of
employees. The Manhart Court, as noted above, did not feel that a factor other than sex
was the controlling factor and rejected the argument. 435 U.S. at 712-13. In Norris, Justice
Marshall reached the same conclusion based upon the Manhart Court's rationale. 103 S. Ct.
at 3496-97.
21. 103 S. Ct. at 3497. Justice Marshall pointed out that the lower federal courts are in
accord with this interpretation with the exception of the Sixth Circuit which held contra in
Peters v. Wayne State, 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983). 103 S.
Ct. at 3497 & n.9.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 3497-98. The Manhart Court supported its argument against sex clas-
sifications in this area by noting that racial as well as sexual classifications affect longevity
but that the policy of Title VII is to eliminate the race factor in employment practices. 435
U.S. at 708-09. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). In the present case
Justice Marshall reiterated the fact that sex and race classifications in employment prac-
tices are unlawful except under the bona fide occupational qualifications exception, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), which was irrelevant to the issue at hand. 103 S. Ct. at 3498 &
n.13.
23. 103 S.Ct. at 3497 n.10. Similarly, Justice Marshall did not find a relevant depar-
ture from Manhart because of the two other available options of the Arizona plan, as those
non-discriminatory options do not make the annuity option fringe benefit any less discrimi-
natory. Id.
24. Id. at 3499.
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tion. 3 Justice Marshall deemed irrelevant the fact that there may
not have been any non-discriminatory insurance plans available on
the open market because the choice of insurance companies was
limited to those companies pre-selected by the state, and those
companies did indeed discriminate based upon sex.2 6 Justice
Marshall also set out the three options that, in light of the Court's
decision, are available to an employer who wants an employee pen-
sion plan for the employer's workforce. He explained that an em-
ployer could alternatively: (1) bring in a third party insurer who
does not discriminate; (2).run the plan internally without discrimi-
nating; or (3) if the previous two options are impractical or impos-
sible, simply do without a pension plan. 7
The final section of Justice Marshall's opinion, which did not
command a majority, dealt with the retroactivity of relief. 28 Justice
Marshall believed that the pension benefits paid to women after
the Manhart decision should be adjusted to reflect the broader
scope of the Norris majority.29 Justice Marshall felt that the dis-
trict court should have investigated further into whether or not
sex-neutral tables could have been applied to the pre-Manhart
contributions of female employees without violating the male em-
ployees' contractual rights to a particular level of contribution and
fashioned relief accordingly.30 Justice Marshall also relied upon
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 1 wherein it was held that since
the purpose of Title VII is to make those persons discriminated
against whole, there is a presumption toward retroactive liability. 2
Justice Marshall concluded that there are no special circumstances
that justify disregarding the Albemarle presumption, as applied to
the period of time after the Manhart decision, a case which, ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, "clearly foreshadowed" the Norris
disposition."
25. Id. at 3501.
26. Id. This state action was distinguished by Justice Marshall from a plan wherein an
employer distributes the past contributions to participants in a lump-sum. Id. In Manhart,
Justice Stevens stated that the Court's holding did not reach a situation wherein an em-
ployer would set aside accumulated contributions and let the participants buy benefits on
the open market, free of employer supervision. 435 U.S. at 717-18.
27. 103 S. Ct. at 3502.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3503-04.
30. Id.
31. 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1976).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 3502.
33. Id. at 3503. The Manhart Court noted that the Albemarle presumption is strong,
but that the district court should have duly considered the equities involved in levying Title
1984
758 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:753
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell criticized the reasoning
of the lead opinion on the Title VII issue.34 He indicated that the
opinion, contrary to the dictates of Manhart,3 5 was detrimental to
the operation of insurance and pension plans, and had the poten-
tial to revolutionize the present insurance industry.
Justice Powell stated that, unlike the plan in Manhart, the Ari-
zona plan was not employer-operated, and that a ruling similar to
Manhart in the present case would expand Title VII's regulatory
reach into the business of insurance, thereby working drastic
changes in the field."6 Regulation of the insurance industry was be-
lieved by Justice Powell to be the domain of the states, and he
relied upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act 1 to support his conten-
tion that Title VII was being improperly expanded by the lead
opinion.33 Justice Powell also refuted the lead opinion's reliance on
the Title VII focus on the individual (as opposed to the class) as
VII relief. 435 U.S. at 719. The Manhart Court concluded that problems involved in the
overhaul of a pension plan coupled with the lack of a clear tendency in the law at the time
toward the Court's holding justified the allotment of prospective relief only. 435 U.S. at 720-
23. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
34. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist as to Parts I and II, dissenting in part, and by the Chief Justice, Justices Black-
mun, Rehnquist and O'Connor as to Part III, concurring in part. 103 S. Ct. at 3504 (Powell,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
35. Id. at 3305 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
36. Id. at 3506 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Stevens,
delivering the opinion of the Court in Manhart, stated that the Title VII violation involved
therein should not lead to an upheaval of the insurance industry, but that the only issue in
the case was the validity of the employer-operated pension plan under Title VII. 435 U.S. at
717. Justice Powell, dissenting in the instant case, stressed the fact that the Manhart major-
ity limited the reach of its decision to pension funds that are employer-operated. 103 S. Ct.
at 3506 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). The Act states that the insurance industry is to be
regulated by the states in the absence of an Act of Congress specifically relating to the
business of insurance and that silence by Congress does not impair the states' regulatory
domain. Id. §§ 1011-1012.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 3507-08 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice
Powell attempted to support his argument through an extensive analysis of the McCarran.
Ferguson Act, and a comment made by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey during the Senate
debates on the Act to the effect that Title VII is not a prohibition of unequal treatment of
the sexes in an industrial-benefit plan. 103 S. Ct. at 3506-07 nn.5 & 6 (Powell, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
In writing for the majority, Justice Marshall felt no need to consider the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act's effect on the Norris litigation since the petitioners failed to raise the matter in
their brief. 103 S. Ct. at 3500 n.17. He nonetheless met Justice Powell's argument by assert-
ing that there was no attempt in the instant case to regulate the insurance industry, but
rather that the only issue was the conduct of an employer that constituted an unfair em-
ployment practice under Title VII and, as such, was outside the scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act which deals only with "the business of insurance." Id.
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having little relevance to the insurance industry.39 He maintained
that since it is impossible for insurers to operate in terms of indi-
vidual life expectancies they must instead determine easily man-
ageable class-based criteria, including legitimate sex-based classifi-
cations. 0 Justice Powell stated that such classifications, when
based upon objective actuarial experience, reflected by sex-based
mortality tables, are not inherently discriminatory in the sense of
the word as it is used in Title VII.
41
In the final section of his opinion, which attracted a majority,
Justice Powell addressed the grant of retroactive relief by the dis-
trict court upon the finding of the Title VII violation.42 For the
reasons espoused in Manhart," Justice Powell contended that only
a prospective remedy was proper in the present situation, espe-
cially in light of the extreme financial hardship that would un-
doubtedly result if retroactive relief were granted."
Justice O'Connor, who, with her concurring opinion, cast the de-
ciding vote on the issues, held with the lead opinion as to the em-
ployment discrimination issue under Title VII and with Justice
39. 103 S. Ct. at 3508-09 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
40. Id. Justice Powell noted that the very inability to predict the length of one indi-
vidual life was why insurance and life annuities exist. Id. at 3508 (Powell, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
41. Id. at 3509 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Powell
stated that the Title VII meaning of the word "discrimination" is "disparate treatment on
the basis of race or sex that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual." Id. at 3509
(Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Blackmun stated in his Man-
hart concurrence that "there is nothing arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory about recog-
nizing the objective and accepted. . . disparity in-female-male life expectancies in comput-
ing rates for retirement plans." 435 U.S. at 724 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). Noting
Justice Blackmun's analysis, Justice Powell concluded that since sex-based mortality tables
are objective and reliable they are therefore non-discriminatory. 103 S. Ct. at 3509 (Powell,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 3509-10 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
43. 435 U.S. at 719. In anhart, the Court stated that in Title VII cases, retroactive
relief is usually proper under the Albemarle decision, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), but since the
Manhart holding was not foreshadowed and also because of the likely disruptive effect on
the pension plans, the relief was denied. 435 U.S. at 719. The Manhart Court felt that even
the most diligent pension administrators would have been unlikely to have foreseen the
Court's barring of the sex-based annuity plans. Id. at 719-20.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice
Powell stated that retroactive relief would result in a cost to employer-sponsored pension
plans of between $817 million and $1260 million a year for the next 15 to 20 years. Id. See,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COST STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF AN EQUAL BENEFITS
RULE ON PENSION BENEFITS 32 (1983). 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). Justice Powell also noted that insurers of pension plans must closely
allocate risk, and that an unforeseen change in the law that the present decision mandates
could result in insolvency for insurers and the pension funds insured by them. Id.
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Powell's opinion as to the retroactivity issue.' Justice O'Connor
felt that the employment discrimination issue before the Court was
a narrow one, and that the Court's only duty was to determine the
88th Congress' intent in making Title VII law."" She explained that
the issues of the wisdom of the statute, the statute's constitutional-
ity,47 and the validity of removal of all sex classifications from in-
surance plans were not before the Court."' Addressing this narrow
Title VII consideration, Justice O'Connor argued that the Manhart
decision expressly permitted the setting aside of equal retirement
benefits to be later used in lump-sum to purchase an annuity pro-
gram on the open market, thereby treating all employees the
same.' 9 Justice O'Connor stated, however, that in the present
case-where the employer, doing more than setting aside funds, of-
fered a plan to be organized by various third-party insurance com-
panies with sexually discriminatory policies-there was a situation
in which the plan was a Title VII "privilege of employment" and
hence, any discrimination was a violation of that provision.50 Thus,
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Marshall's lead opinion on the dis-
crimination issue.51
As to the retroactivity issue, Justice O'Connor maintained that
the resulting inequities flowing from a retroactive application com-
pelled prospective relief 5 2 Justice O'Connor cited the three criteria
stated by the Court in Chevron Oil v. Huson,5 to determine
whether or not a decision involving statutory interpretation should
be applied prospectively.5' She explained that the Court's decision
would be so applied if: (1) the interpretation stated a new principal
of law; (2) retroactive application would retard the operation of the
statute; or (3) retroactive application would impose inequitable re-
sults.5 5 Justice O'Connor based her prospectivity vote on the third
criterion because of the reliance on which participants in pension
45. Id. at 3511-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 3511 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. In a footnote, Justice Marshall noted that a fourteenth amendment claim by
respondents was rejected by the district court and was not raised as a cross-appeal from
that ruling. 103 S. Ct. at 3495 n.4. See 486 F. Supp. 645, 651 (1980).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3511 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 3511 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. 404 U.S. 97, 105-09 (1971).




plans have placed on the plans in making retirement decisions.56
Those pension plans could conceivably be destroyed by a retroac-
tive application of the present decision, which would leave inno-
cent workers unjustly damaged, according to Justice O'Connor.5
7
Thus, with Justice O'Connor's concurring vote, the decision was
made prospective only."
The introduction of the sex discrimination ban into Title VII by
the 88th Congress was surrounded by some confusion,59 and hence
there is little to be gained from an examination of legislative intent
as to specific sexually discriminatory employment practices.60 As a
result of the minimal legislative guidelines, the narrow issue of sex
discrimination in employee pension plans spawned extensive schol-
arly speculation and proposals, before any Supreme Court disposi-
tion, as to how the issue should be handled upon eventual
challenges."'
The first Supreme Court case to address the issue, the Manhart
decision, involved a factual situation that did not require the
Court to make a broad decision. The issue in Manhart was limited
to whether a requirement that men and women make unequal con-
tributions to an employer-operated pension plan was lawful under
Title VII.6 As Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
noted in reversing and remanding a pre-Manhart district court de-
cision,64 the intervening Manhart decision involved a situation
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3512-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. For the view that opponents of Title VII proposed that the sex discrimination
issue be included in the Act in an attempt to make it less likely to pass, see Developments
in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. For a comprehensive
argument contra, see Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex
to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DuQ. L. REV.
453, 454 (1981), where the author maintains that the sex factor was included in the Act to
protect women from discrimination in the same manner and degree as those persons dis-
criminated against because of race or national origin, with the sole exception of the Title
VII bona fide occupational qualifications which are a limiting factor to certain types of sex
classification. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
60. See Developments, supra note 59, at 1167.
61. See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Bene-
fits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489, 491 & n.10 (1982) (citing much of the im-
portant pre-Manhart commentary).
62. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
63. Id. at 717.
64. EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977). The district court distin-
guished the Manhart cases (which had been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court at the
time) by noting, inter alia, that Colby College involved unequal benefits and equal contribu-
1984
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where the most obvious disparity of treatment was present: women
had more money withheld and therefore less take-home pay, than
did similarly situated men.65 The specific nature of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Manhart, which did not extend to the legality of
unequal benefits based on sex nor to the effect of a plan not oper-
ated by employers, anticipated further resolution of the open ques-
tions, and thus the commentators were again very active.6
Since Manhart was the primary precedent relied upon by the
Norris majority on the Title VII issue,6 7 the scope of the former
decision should be examined carefully to discover the significance
of Norris. Justice Stevens, writing for the Manhart Court, was
quite specific in setting forth the holding, stating that, "we do not
suggest that [Title VII] was intended to revolutionize the insur-
tions, the converse of the Manhart situation. Id. at 637-38.
65. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1143 (1st Cir. 1978). By way of dictum,
Judge Aldrich, writing for the appeals court, noted that in light of the Supreme Court's
narrow holding in Manhart, the district court on remand would have to face problems that
were not present in Manhart. Expanding on this point, Judge Aldrich was wary of the sub-
sidy of women as a class by men as a class that would result from unisex actuarial tables
because women, who as a class live longer, will get more benefits in the long run. It appeared
to Judge Aldrich that the subsidy would be based on sex. Id. at 1144-45. Further, he noted
that if some plans allow women to surrender the annuity for a lump sum, an inequality
would result because of the practical short-circuiting of the actuarial prediction through the
conversion. Id. at 1146. It is notable that the Norris plans allowed for such conversion to
lump-sum. See 103 S. Ct. at 3494. Chief Judge Coffin, concurring in Colby College, criticized
Judge Aldrich's commentary as going beyond the facts of the case, and furthermore stated
that he did not necessarily share the Judge's views of the Manhart implications. 589 F.2d at
1146 (Coffin, C.J., concurring).
66. See Benston, supra note 61, at 491-92 & nn.13-15, which contains a collection of
relevant law review commentary.
67. Two years before the landmark Manhart decision relied upon in Norris, the Su-
preme Court had confronted a similar Title VII problem in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976), a case which was relied upon by the appellant, Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power, in the Manhart case. A divided Court in Gilbert held that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy from an employer's disability insurance plan was not a violation of Title
VII. Id. at 145-46. As noted by the Manhart Court, there were two groups involved in the
Gilbert situation which were determined to be pregnant women and nonpregnant persons,
the latter group obviously consisting of both women and men. 435 U.S. at 715.
In distinguishing the Gilbert decision, the Manhart Court noted this factor of treating
only pregnant women differently and concluded that whereas the Gilbert plan discrimi-
nated based on a physical disability, the Manhart plan discriminated on the basis of sex
only. Id. Any problems with this distinction were mooted as a practical matter by Congress'
enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978), which amended Title VII to the effect that "the terms 'because of sex' or 'on the
basis of sex' include ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-
cal conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 723-25 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This statutory development
was examined at some length and deemed consistent with Manhart by Justice Marshall in
Norris. See 103 S. Ct. at 3498 n.14.
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ance and pension industries. All that is at issue today is a require-
ment that men and women make unequal contributions to an em-
ployer-operated pension fund." 8 Nothing was said about pension
funds which are not operated by employers or which issue unequal
benefits. The Court also left open the possibility of employers set-
ting aside the accumulated employee contributions in lump sum
form at retirement, each individual participant then investing his
or her share on the open market.0 9 Clearly, the Manhart case set
the stage for further development of the issue involved.
In the period between Manhart and Norris, the lower federal
courts dealt with several cases involving non-mandatory, defined-
contribution7" employee pension plans run by private insurers. 71 As
there was a lack of uniformity in these decisions, the time was ap-
parently ripe for the Supreme Court to settle the matter by a re-
view of the Norris case. As the Norris Court was confronted with a
68. 435 U.S. at 717. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 717-18..The Court then made a statement which, along with an explanatory
footnote, caused some controversy over what might lie ahead. The statement was that the
Court's decision did not "call into question the insurance industry practice of considering
the composition of an employer's workforce in determining the probable cost of a retirement
or benefit plan." Id. at 718. The footnote construed Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to the
effect that there was no prohibition on determination of the funding requirements by look-
ing at the workforce composition. Id. n.34.
According to one article, this construction of Title VII could lead to employers having a
disincentive to hire women, if it is known that in so doing, the pension costs of the employ-
ers' businesses will rise. Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Manhart's
Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1241 passim (1978).
70. Defined contribution plans, also called "money purchase" plans, are those in which
the pay-in amount to the pension fund is equal for men and women, while the benefit pay-
ment will be greater for similarly situated men than for women. Key, Sex-based Pension
Plans in Perspective: City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2
HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 13-14 (1978). The Arizona plan prohibited by Norris was of this
type. 103 S. Ct. at 3497. Conversely, defined benefit plans, also called "formula benefit"
plans are those in which men and women receive equal benefits after unequal contributions.
Key, supra, at 15. It was this type of plan that was banned in Manhart. 435 U.S. at 717.
71. Some of the major cases dealt with annuity plans run for private and public educa-
tional institutions and foundations by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
(TIAA) and its companion organization, College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), both
non-profit life insurance companies. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d
1054 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the district court's decision which held that TIAA/CREF was
subject to Title VII and in violation thereof); Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235
(6th Cir. 1981) (reversing a decision against the defendants Wayne State University and
TIAA/CREF and holding that there was no Title VII violation since the plan was not em-
ployer-operated, the actuarial value of the benefits to similarly situated men and women
was equal, and the plan had defined contributions for men and women); EEOC v. Colby
College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the suit and
remanding for a trial on the merits in light of Manhart).
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situation distinct from Manhart in the aforementioned respects, 72
the goal in Norris was obviously to determine whether the differ-
ent factors involved in the case compelled a result different from
the Manhart ruling.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Norris plurality on the Title
VII issue, appeared to realize that there would be a strong reaction
to extending Manhart to reach the Norris situation, and posited
the various options available, including the possibility that an em-
ployer wishing to have an employee pension plan would have to
forego such a fringe benefit if it were impracticable or impossible
to operate the plan in a non-discriminatory manner. 7 As Justice
Powell despairingly pointed out in his dissent, in the Norris scena-
rio, Arizona took the latter option and discontinued the annuity
feature of the plan after the adverse appeals court decision. 74 This
action meant that a state employee who now seeks annuity benefits
must withdraw his or her accumulated savings from the state fund,
pay tax on that amount, and then invest it on the open market
with a private insurer who probably uses sex-based mortality ta-
bles, an effect that Justice Powell found rather self-defeating, a re-
curring complaint in his Norris dissent.
7 5
The Norris decision had as its foundation the lead opinion's
broad Title VII ruling which was the statute's policy as interpreted
in Manhart: that employers must treat employees as individuals
and not as members of sex- or race-based classes.76 It was the ex-
tension of that worthy policy into all cases of blatant sexual classi-
fications that Justice Powell rejected, by stating that in an area of
such established, customary procedures as the insurance industry,
such an extension is not justified.77
The different views of the case seem to reflect the balancing of
the interests of policy and practicality. The interest of practicality
swayed Justice O'Connor to the prospectivity of relief side, based
upon the gross burdens that would possibly deter or cripple the
pension industry if retroactive relief were granted. 78 The policy of
Title VII, however, was not contravened by this recognition of the
72. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 3506 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Norris).
75. Id.
76. 435 U.S. at 708. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3508-09 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).




practicality issue as to the type of relief to be granted. The results
of the decision were merely limited to a ban on future discrimina-
tory plans, as opposed to past discriminations, while the wrongness
of all of these types of discriminatory plans, in theory, was posi-
tively asserted.
It follows that the next matters which must be considered in an-
alyzing Norris are the implications of the decision on employers
desiring to offer annuity plans, and insurance companies that pro-
vide such plans to employers. Clearly, benefits derived from em-
ployee contributions will now have to be determined on a sex-neu-
tral basis.79 In a defined-contribution plan, such as the one
involved in Norris, the problem of equalization of benefits can be
resolved by having the employer (or private insurer) "top up" the
female benefits after the effective date of Norris by applying male
mortality tables to all employees, or by setting up a longevity table
that reflects the total work force governed by a given plan.80 In
employer-operated plans, it has been theorized that there will be a
disincentive to hire women and thereby add to the total longevity
of the workforce, which would result in increased labor costs to the
employer.81 If the second option-that of a completely unisex
workforce table-is selected, an employer may be faced with the
male employees choosing to take their contributions in a lump-
sum, with the result that the members of the annuity fund would
be primarily female, which would again result in higher costs to the
employer because of greater female longevity.
82
As to private insurers, the requirements of Norris will necessi-
tate their issuance of a unisex pension plan which, as already men-
tioned, would have dubious appeal to men, who could leave the
plan and get higher benefits by investing their individual lump-
79. See 103 S. Ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 3512 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that the portion
of the Equal Pay Act which disallows reducing any employee's wage rate as a cure to an Act
violation would not mean that employers must use male mortality tables and "top up" ben-
efits to the female workers, rather than apply a single adjusted unisex table. She felt that
the applicability of the Act was questionable here because it speaks only to wages, and even
if the Act is relevant, it should not be applied to contravene a pension plan's purpose of
calculating benefits based on workforce composition. Id.
81. See, e.g., Benston, supra note 61, at 532-36. Contra Key, supra note 70, at 17-18
(setting forth empirical reasons why such disincentives are unlikely to be a significant factor
in employer hiring decisions). Cf. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1145, 1146 (1st Cir.
1978).
82. See Prestley, The Graying of America, Employee Legal Benefits Problems, 16 Fo-
RUM 1113, 1124-25 (1980-81).
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sums in a private plan.83 The passage of time will determine
whether or not the changes wrought by Norris will have an ex-
traordinary effect on the insurance industry and the individual
preferences of male employees as to adverse selection of non-em-
ployer-operated plans, and whether or not Norris will result in em-
ployer disincentive to hire women.
In Manhart, Justice Stevens stated that he did not intend to
revolutionize the insurance industry.8 4 The absence of retroactive
relief in both the Manhart and Norris decisions was presumably in
furtherance of that end. Norris, however, in expanding the reach of
Manhart into employer-offered nonmandatory defined-contribu-
tion plans run by private companies will undoubtedly change the
way even more employers and insurers plan pensions, and could be
a sign of a trend toward a total re-working of all sex-based insur-
ance tables, despite the present validity of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Whether the actual Norris expansion was for valid policy rea-
sons or was merely carrying good legislation too far may depend
upon one's point of view,8 5 but it is difficult to dispute the notion
that some type of "revolution" will result in the insurance industry
based upon the Court's application of Title VII in Norris.
John M. Giunta
83. See id.
84. 435 U.S. at 717.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3509 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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